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The practice of capital punishment within the United States now
provokes concern and condemnation in many parts of the world. The United
States and Japan are the only developed countries to retain this barbaric
sanction. Capital punishment has fallen into disuse as a part of criminal law in
virtually all of Europe, most of Latin America and much of Africa. It is
excluded by the ad hoc international tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and
Rwanda, as well as by the newly-created International Criminal Court.
According to statistics published by the Secretary-General of the United
Nations, approximately two-thirds of the world's countries have abolished the
death penalty.1 Nearly seventy2 have confirmed this important development
by subscribing to international legal instruments that outlaw capital
punishment and prevent its reintroduction.3
Although it cannot yet be said that capital punishment is prohibited by a
customary law rule of universal application, the death penalty as it is carried
out in the United States has been condemned by a variety of international and
national treaty bodies, courts and political institutions.
As early as 1987, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights
declared that the execution of juvenile offenders in South Carolina and
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1. See generally Report of the Secretary-General, Capital Punishment and Implementation of
the Safeguards Guaranteeing Protection of the Rights of those Facing the Death Penalty, U.N. ESCOR,
U.N. Doc E/2000/3 (2000).
2. Id. at 39 (Table 6).
3. Protocol No. 6 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms Concerning the Abolition of the Death Penalty, openedfor signature Apr. 28, 1983, E.T.S.
114; Second Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights Aimed at
Abolition of the Death Penalty, G.A. Res. 44/128, Dec. 15, 1989, 29 I.L.M. 1464; Additional Protocol to
the American Convention on Human Rights to Abolish the Death Penalty, June 8, 1990, O.A.S.T.S. No.
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Louisiana ran counter to the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of
Man.4
In 1989, the European Court of Human Rights ruled that extradition
from the United Kingdom to Virginia would violate the European Convention
on Human Rights because the prolonged period of post-conviction detention
prior to execution, the "death row phenomenon," constituted inhuman and
degrading treatment or punishment.
5
In 1994, the United Nations Human Rights Committee declared that
execution by means of the gas chamber in California was contrary to the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.6
Many national courts, often relying on international law to reach their
conclusions, now prohibit their governments from extraditing fugitives to the
United States if they are to face the death penalty.7
In an August 2000 resolution, the United Nations Sub-Commission on
the Protection and Promotion of Human Rights called upon all states to
abolish the death penalty for those under eighteen at the time of the offense, a
statement of clear relevance to the United States. United Nations human
rights monitoring bodies, such as the Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial,
Summary and Arbitrary Institutions9 and the High Commissioner for Human
Rights,10 have also taken up the issue.
Probably the most aggressive and systematic international critics of
United States practice in recent years have been the institutions of the fifteen-
member European Union. One of its component organs, the European
Parliament, regularly adopts resolutions that address capital punishment issues
within the United States. European Union embassies in Washington frequently
send demarches to the United States government condemning the practice of
the death penalty." The European Union has even intervened as an amicus
curiae in a case pending before the Supreme Court of the United States.'
2
4. Resolution No. 3/87, Roach & Pinkerton v. United States, 8 HuM. RTs. L.J. 345 (1987),
No. 9647 (Sept. 1987). Since Roach & Pinkerton, the Commission has made several important findings
against the United States in death-penalty cases. E.g., Report No. 57/96, Andrews v. United States, No.
11.139 (Dec. 1996); Report No. 52/01, Garza v. United States, No. 12.243 (Apr. 2001).
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Matiere D'Extradition, 9 REV. FR. DROIT ADM. 1166 (Oct. 1993) (C. Vigoreux, conclusions).
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on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, Res. 2000117, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/SUB.2/RES/2000/17 (2000).
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10. Statement by Mary Robinson, United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights,
U.N. Press Release, U.N. Doc. HR/98/6 (Feb. 4, 1998).
11. See Press Release, Embassy of Sweden, Washington, E.U. Policy on the Death Penalty
(May 10, 2001), available at http://www.eurunion.orgllegislat/DeathPenaltylDemarchel0may.htm. A
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Opponents of the death penalty who have only begun to learn of this vast
and constantly growing body of material condemning the United States
frequently ask if its violations of international law cannot be taken to the
"world court." For non-specialists, it seems almost axiomatic that this should
be the body to condemn breaches of the law of nations.
Students of public international law know better. First, they understand
that most international human rights law instruments, with their specialized
mechanisms to adjudicate issues between an individual and his or her own
government, simply do not fall within the jurisdictional scope of the
International Court of Justice. Even with important exceptions-one thinks of
the three genocide cases now pending before the Court as examples of the
body being used to litigate issues at the core of international human rights
law 3 -there are often insurmountable obstacles because so few States
actually accept the optional clause in the Court's Statute.
The United States of America, of course, has been hostile to the
International Court of Justice since the mid-1980s when it was condemned for
supporting the Contras in Nicaragua. When the United States ratified the
Genocide Convention in 1987, it formulated a reservation to Article IX in
order to exclude the jurisdiction of the Court for disputes about the
interpretation and application of that instrument.
There was a notable exception to Washington's antipathy for the
International Court of Justice. The United States is a party to the Optional
Protocol to the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, which gives the
Court jurisdiction in litigation between States on issues of consular
protection. 14 Back in 1980, the United States had successfully sued Iran before
the Court with respect to the Tehran Embassy occupation. Perhaps for this
reason, the United States stayed within the scheme even when it more
generally turned its back on the world's premier international judicial body.
The possibility that the Optional Protocol to the Vienna Convention
might become a vehicle to challenge the death penalty within the United
States before the Court began to interest abolitionists. It became apparent that
rightsldoc/report00_en.pdf (describing dialogue sessions with the United States as providing an
"opportunity to raise the question of the death penalty").
12. Brief for European Union as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner, McCarver v. North
Carolina, 532 U.S. 941 (2001) (No. 00-8727).
13. Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide (Bosh. & Herz v. Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)), 1993 I.C.J. 3, 16 (April 8) (Request
for the Indication of Provisional Measures); Application of the Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)), 1993
I.C.J 325 (Sept 13); Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)), 1996 I.C.L 595 (July 11)
(Preliminary Objections); Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime
of Genocide, Counter-claims, 1997 LC.J 243 (Order of 7 December); Legality of Use of Force
(Yugoslavia v. BeIg.), 1999 I.C.J. (April 28) (Request for the indication of provisional measures);
Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Croatia v.
Yugoslavia), 1999 I.C.r. (July 2) (Application by the Republic of Croatia Instituting Proceedings against
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia).
14. Optional Protocol to the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, Concerning the
Compulsory Settlement of Disputes, Apr. 18, 1961, 23 U.S.T. 3374, 500 U.N.T.S. 241.
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hundreds of foreign nationals who had never been informed of their right to
seek consular assistance were awaiting execution. In 1998, Paraguay filed an
application against the United States concerning the impending execution of
Angel Breard by the state of Virginia. 15 Before it could be heard on the
merits, the United States had executed Breard, and Paraguay subsequently
dropped the case. It was hard to demonstrate that Breard had been convicted
because of the lack of consular assistance, and this made the fact situation less
compelling than it might have been.
Then Germany picked up the baton in 1999 in the case of the LaGrand
brothers. Although Berlin had made its opposition to the death penalty quite
clear in diplomatic correspondence with United States authorities prior to
filing the application, 16 the German government was determined to keep the
death penalty on the margins of the litigation. In the provisional measures
order, the Court noted carefully that the case did not concern "the entitlement
of the federal states within the United States to resort to the death penalty for
the most heinous crimes. 17 Only the Japanese judge, Oda, often the source of
lonely and eccentric individual opinions, seemed to want to make an issue of
capital punishment, although not in the direction that Germany or any
abolitionist would have wanted. In paragraph 2 of his individual opinion on
the issue of provisional measures, he said: "...if Mr. Walter LaGrand's rights
as they relate to humanitarian issues are to be respected then, in parallel, the
matter of the rights of victims of violent crime (a point which has often been
overlooked) should be taken into consideration."' 8
Death penalty issues are no more present in the Court's final judgment
of June 27, 2001. The popular conception of the case may well be that capital
punishment within the United States suffered yet another stinging rebuke in a
prestigious international body. In reality, though, the case was about a
different issue entirely. Or was it?
On a narrow interpretation, the judgment addresses the ability of the
International Court of Justice to issue binding provisional measures orders.
The United States had not even tried to argue against the claim that the Vienna
Convention had been breached.' 9 It is perhaps astonishing that the issue of the
Court's power to issue binding provisional measures orders had remained
undecided throughout the twentieth century. The matter was a source of some
dispute because of the apparently hesitant language of its Statute on this
subject, which talks of a power to "indicate" rather than to "order" such
measures.
The Court held that provisional measures must indeed be mandatory
because a contrary view would frustrate the object and purpose of the
15. Case Concerning the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (Para. v. U.S.),
Provisional Measures, 1998 I.C.J. 248 (order of Apr. 9).
16. LaGrand Case (F.R.G. v. U.S.), 2001 I.C.J. 26 (June 27), available at http://www.icj-
cij.org.
17. LaGrand Case (F.R.G. v. U.S.), 1999 I.C.J. 25 (March 3) (Request for the Indication of
Provisional Measures), available at http://www.icj-cij.org.
18. Id, Declaration of Judge Oda, 2.
19. LaGrand Case (F.R.G. v. U.S.), 2001 I.C.J. 123 (June 27).
institution as a forum for the settlement of international disputes.20 This was
really nothing more than an issue of treaty interpretation, without much
significance in other international legal systems where legal provisions are
worded differently.
But fortunately the Court went further, citing with approval a statement
from its predecessor, the Permanent Court of International Justice, which had
referred to "the principle universally accepted by international tribunals and
likewise laid down in many conventions.., to the effect that the parties to a
case must abstain from any measure capable of exercising a prejudicial effect
in regard to the execution of the decision to be given, and, in general, not
allow any step of any kind to be taken which might aggravate or extend the
dispute."' 1
These facts make perfect sense. It would seem axiomatic that a body
with the authority to settle judicial disputes should be entitled to indicate to
the parties that they must preserve the status quo ex ante, pending a final
decision. And yet the wording of international legal instruments in this area
has always suffered from equivocation. For example, in LaGrand, the Court
refers to the travaux prdparatoires of the relevant provision of its Statute
where it seems clear enough that there was a reluctance to use unambiguous
terms. But for the Court, the travaux are not really determinative of the issue.
We confront the same problem in application of the major international
human rights treaties. The American Convention on Human Rights is the only
instrument to state clearly that its principal adjudicative body, the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights, has the power to "order" provisional
measures. 22 The European Convention on Human Rights is silent on the issue,
although the European Commission on Human Rights once tried to fill the gap
with a provision in its internal regulations. In 1991, however, the European
Court of Human Rights ruled in a close vote that the silence of the Convention
meant such orders were not binding. 23 When the Convention underwent a
major revision in the late 1990s, the omission was never corrected.24
Like the European Convention, the Optional Protocol to the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which creates an
individual petition mechanism before the United Nations Human Rights
Committee, says nothing about provisional measures. The Committee has
itself provided for such a mechanism in article 86 of its Rules.25 Interim
20. Id. 102.
21. Id. 103 (citing Electricity Co. of Sofia and Bulgaria, 1939 P.C.I.J (ser. A/B) No. 79, at
199 (Dec. 5)).
22. American Convention on Human Rights, supra note 3, art. 63(2).
23. Cruz Varas v. Sweden, No. 201, 14 Eur. H.R Rep. I (ser. A) (Mar. 1991).
24. Protocol No. 11 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, restructuring the control machinery established thereby, May 11, 1994, E.T.S. 155, 15 HuM.
RTS. L.J. 86 (1994).
25. Adoption of the Rules of Procedure of the Committee in Accordance with Article 39 of
the Covenant, U.N. Human Rights Committee, 17th Mtg., U.N. Doc. CCPRIC/SR.17, 25-26 (1977);
Adoption of Further Rules of Procedure of the Committee in Accordance with Article 39 of the
Covenant, U.N. Human Rights Committee, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/3IRev.1 (1979); Provisional Rules of
Procedure for the Consideration of Communications Received Under the Optional Protocol, U.N.
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measures are of potentially great significance in cases before the Committee
concerning the death penalty, and it has often had occasion to make such
"requests".
Jamaica, against whom the vast majority of petitions under the Optional
Protocol in death penalty cases have been directed, appears generally to have
respected interim measures requests from the Human Rights Committee as a
matter of policy. The same cannot be said of Canada, which literally defied
two such requests in 1991 when it extradited death row fugitives Joseph
Kindler and Charles Ng to the United States.26 In a subsequent case, the
Canadian government observed a provisional measures request from the
Committee until it had ruled on the merits of the case.
27
The Committee was of course unhappy with Canada's non-compliance,
but it tackled the matter with some circumspection. In its Views, the
Committee meekly "expresse[d] its regret that the State party did not accede
to the Special Rapporteur's request" not to extradite Kindler.2' As for Ng, in
which the Committee concluded there was a breach of article 7 of the
Covenant, the Views do not even criticize Canada for its contemptuous
attitude, stating only that Canada should "make such representations as might
still be possible to avoid the imposition of the death penalty., 29 Only
Francisco Josd Aguilar Urbina, in an individual dissenting opinion, took
Canada to task, saying that the country "failed to display the good faith which,
ought to prevail among the parties to the Protocol and the Covenant."30 In its
concluding observations on Canada's fourth periodic report, the Committee
"expresse[d] its concern" that Canada considered that it was not required to
comply with requests for interim measures, and urged Canada to revise its
policy.
31
The Committee's caution may have only encouraged other governments
to show the same disregard as did Canada for interim measures requests, and
several other countries followed Ottawa's miserable example, executing
offenders before their petitions could be judged.32 The Committee has now
become much more aggressive on the subject, especially in death penalty
cases. In November 2000, the Committee said that States parties to the
Optional Protocol had made an implicit undertaking to cooperate with the
Human Rights Committee, Selected Decisions under the Optional Protocol (2nd to 16th Sess.), Annex
M1, at 155, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/OP/1.
26. Kindler v. Canada, Communication No. 470/1991, U.N. Doc. A/48/40 (July 1993), 14
HUM. RTs. L.J. 307 (1993); Ng v. Canada, Communication No. 469/1991, U.N. Doc. A/49/40 (Sept.
1991), 15 HuM. RTS. L.J. 149 (1994).
27. Cox v. Canada, Communication No. 539/1993, U.N. Doc. CCPRIC/52/Df539/1993, 15
HUM. RTS. L.J 410 (Nov. 1993).
28. Kindler, supra note 26, 17.
29. Ng, supra note 26, 18.
30. Id. 1612.
31. Final Observations of the Human Rights Committee: Canada, U.N. Human Rights
Committee, 65th Sess., U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add.105, 14 (1999).
32. Case 580/1994, Ashby v. Trinidad and Tobago, U.N. Doc. CCPRIC/54fD/580/1994 (July
1994); Cases 839, 840 & 841/1998, Kandu-Bo v. Sierra Leone, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/64/D/839, 840 &
841/1998 (Nov. 1998); Case 869/1999, Piandong v. Philippines, U.N. Doc. CCPRIC/70/0/869/1999, In
1.2-1.5 (Oct. 2000).
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Committee in good faith. "It is incompatible with these obligations for a State
party to take any action that would prevent or frustrate the Committee in its
consideration and examination of the communication, and in the expression of
its Views," the Committee said.33 The Committee added that a State that
proceeded with an execution after being notified of a communication, even in
the absence of an interim measures request and before the Committee had
concluded its consideration and examination of the case, "commits grave
breaches of its obligations under the Optional Protocol.
34
In July 2001, in its Views on a series of applications from Sierra Leone,
where petitioners were executed by firing squad despite an interim measures
request from the Committee, it wrote: "[T]he State party would be committing
a serious breach of its obligations under the Optional Protocol if it engages in
any acts which have the effect of preventing or frustrating consideration by
the Committee of a communication alleging any violation of the Covenant, or
to render examination by the Committee moot and the expression of its Views
nugatory and futile."
35
LaGrand is of immense assistance here in its suggestion that interim
measures to prevent irreparable harm, preserving the status quo in cases which
cannot otherwise be corrected by a final decision, are an inherent function of
adjudicative bodies. In this respect, the Court might have confined its ruling to
questions of interpretation of its own Statute. This outcome would have
reduced the significance of its ruling considerably with respect to other
bodies. As such, the judges of the International Court of Justice, in a case
where the death penalty was only a subtext, have handed a powerful precedent
to international human rights bodies that confront death penalty issues directly
on a very regular basis.
To this extent, then, the LaGrand decision is very much about capital
punishment. A dimension of the precedent that remains to be explored
concerns the transposition of the LaGrand principle before national courts
when international treaty bodies are involved. When an institution like the
Human Rights Committee makes an interim measures order, can litigants use
national courts in order to enforce the order? Can it be argued that because
such an order is binding, in accordance with the principles underlying
paragraphs 102 and 103 of the LaGrand decision, national courts should issue
injunctive relief to prevent defiant governments from disobeying interim
measures requests from treaty bodies?
Obviously, there are difficult technical issues here, many of which relate
to procedural law in individual jurisdictions. But the principle ought to be
clear enough. Governments will of course attempt to argue that they are free
to disobey interim measures orders because of the classic and well-known
disconnects between international and national law. Even where treaties are
themselves self-executing, it will be suggested that the actual orders of an
33. Piandong, supra note 32, 5.1.
34. Id. 5.2. See also Cases 839/1998, 840/1998 & 841/1998, Mansaraj v. Sierra Leone, UN
Doe. CCPRICI72/D84011998, 6.2 (July 2001).
35. Mansaraj, supra note 34, 5.2.
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international treaty body like the Human Rightg Committee or the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights cannot be enforced by national
justice systems in the absence of clear legislation.
However, these arguments are just a bit too cute. Courts everywhere
issue injunctive relief on an interim or provisional basis in order to preserve
rights pending settlement of disputes on the merits. Case law in some common
law jurisdictions now acknowledges that litigants are entitled to a "reasonable
expectation" that any decisions taken by governments that affect them must
not be arbitrary. Official decision-makers, including governors and ministers
with the authority to prevent or delay implementation of capital punishment,
should be required at the very least to await determination by an international
treaty body in a pending death penalty case. Even if the administrative
decision-maker is not bound by the ultimate finding on the merits, the
condemned man or woman should, at a minimum, be entitled to have the
ruling of an international body taken into account in a final determination
concerning pardon, commutation, or extradition. This was essentially the
position taken by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in a series of
Jamaican appeals in September 2000.36
The LaGrand ruling must become an important new piece in arguments
that rely on the significance of interim measures rulings from international
human rights treaty bodies. Coming from the United Nations' premier judicial
body, the judgment may command greater respect and credibility than does
case law from human rights treaty bodies. It is, consequently, a precedent of
potentially considerable significance in death penalty jurisprudence.
The judges-and the German government-may have sought to avoid
the issue of capital punishment. And yet like Basil Fawlty who, in a notorious
comic sketch, is warned by his shrewish wife not to "talk about the war," the
issue of the death penalty in LaGrand is simply unavoidable. Even if the
Court did so inadvertently, the decision has effectively advanced the
protection of individuals facing capital punishment.
36. Lewis v. A.G. Jamaica, [2001] 2 AC 50 (P.C. 2000) (appeals taken from Jamaica) (App.
Nos. 60, 65 and 69 of 1999 & 10 of 2000).
